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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-FOURTHAMENDMENT~MMIGRATION
CHECKPOINT STOPSFOR QUESTIONING
ARE MASONABLE
WJTHOUTINDIVIDUALIZED S U S P I C I O N - UStates
~ ~ ~ ~v.~Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.

543 (1976).

The instant case was a consolidation of two cases, both involving the constitutionality of stops for questioning at permanent immigration checkpoints removed from the Mexican border.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
conflicting decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.
The Ninth Circuit case, United States u. Martinez-Fuerte,
consolidated three cases involving routine stops a t the San Clemente, California, checkpoint to inquire about citizenship and illegal alienage,l pursuant to which all defendants were arrested for
illegally transporting Mexican alien^.^ Because of the large volume of traffic at that checkpoint, a "point" officer screens traffic
as it proceeds through the checkpoint lanes and selects a small
percentage of the cars for referral to a secondary questioning
area.4 None of the challenged stops a t San Clemente involved
suspicion based on any articulable facts; the illegal alienage of
the defendants' passengers was discovered during questioning
after discretionary referral to the secondary area. The Ninth Circuit held such stops to be inconsistent with the fourth amendment because they were not justified by founded suspicion that
the defendants' automobiles actually contained illegal alien^.^
In the Fifth Circuit case, Sifuentes u. United States,"he
defendant was stopped a t the Sarita, Texas, checkpoint where all
1. 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975), reu'd, 428 U S . 543 (1976).
2. Amado Martinez-Fuerte was convicted of illegally transporting aliens after his
pretrial motion for suppression of evidence was denied. Id. a t 309-10.
United States v. Jiminez-Garcia and United States v. Guillen were heard by a different judge and defense motions for suppression were granted. 428 US. a t 549 n.4.
3. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that any person transporting an
alien who he knows is illegally in the United States is guilty of a felony. 8 U.S.C. 8
1324(a)(2)(1970). Three of the defendants in the Ninth Circuit case were also charged with
conspiracy to commit the offense, a violation of 18 U.S.C. $ 371 (1970). 428 U S . a t 54849.
4. A full description of the checkpoint and procedure is set forth in the Court's
opinion. 428 U S . at 545-47. Fewer than one percent of the cars are stopped for questioning.
Id. at 563 n.16.
5. 514 F.2d at 314-16. The circuit court reversed the conviction of Amado MartinezFuerte and affirmed the orders to suppress evidence in the other two cases. Id. at 322.
6. 517 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1975) (mem.), aff'd, 428 U S . 543 (1976).
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cars are stopped and subjected to brief inquiry about citizenship.
Sifuentes' car contained four illegal aliens who were slumped
down in their seats and not visible to the officer until-he approached the car. The officer's questions revealed the passengers'
status as illegal aliens.' Sifuentes was convicted of illegally transporting aliens, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed?
The Supreme Court, affirming the conviction in Sifuentes
and reversing the decision in Martinez-Fuerte, held that checkpoint stops for questioning are constitutional under the fourth
amendment even if not justified by individualized suspicion and
that permanent checkpoint operation does not require the advance authorization of a judicial warrant.'

A. Historical Development of Immigration Search and Seizure
Law
1. Statutory law

Immigration search and seizure law has always had a statutory basis. The first act restricting immigration in 1875 contained
search and seizure provisions and guidelines.1° These searches
and seizures were limited to national borders until 1946, when
immigration officers were first empowered to conduct warrantless
searches "within a reasonable distance" from the border." The
current authorization, the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952,12 adopts this same "reasonable distance" standard for
searches away from the border? Specifically, the Act now empowers officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
7. 428 U.S. at 550.
8. Sifuentes' conviction in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas was
affirmed without a published opinion. United States v. Sifuentes, 517 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir.
1975). The Fifth Circuit relied on its holding in United States v. Santibanez, 517 F.2d 922
(5th Cir. 1975). See 428 U.S. a t 550.
9. 428 U.S. at 545.
10. The Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477 (implied repeal 1917), authorized inspection by the collector of the port to search ships for undesirable aliens, such as
felons or prostitutes, if he had reason to believe they were on board.
11. Act of Aug. 7,1946, ch. 768,60 Stat. 865 (amending Act of Feb. 27, 1925, ch. 364,
43 Stat. 1014, 1049) (repealed 1952). The 1925 Act had authorized the search of vehicles
or conveyances in which the officer believed aliens were entering the country. The 1946
Act deleted the language "in which he believes aliens are being brought in to the United
States" and substituted "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the
United States."
12. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970).
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(INS) without a warrant not only to board any vehicle or conveyance within a reasonable distance from the border to search for
aliens, but also to interrogate anyone believed to be an alien
concerning his right to be in the country.14Pursuant to a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General, a reasonable distance
was defined to be within 100 miles of an external boundary of the
United States.15
2. Early judicial determinations

The INS power to search and interrogate away from the border without a warrant or probable cause has long been recognized
by the courts. But the only Supreme Court statement on the
subject prior to 197316was dictum in a 1925 Prohibition Act easel7
recognizing a probable cause exception a t the border:
Travellers may be so stopped [on the chance of finding
something illegal in each automobile] in crossing an international. boundary . . . . But those lawfully within the country
. . . have a right to free passage without interruption or search
unless there is known to be a competent official authorized to
search, [and] probable cause for believing that their vehicles
are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.18

While that statement indicated a limitation on the government's
power to search or seize once a person is within the country,l"t
14. 8 U.S.C. 8 1357(a)(1970):
(a) Powers without warrant.
Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations
shall have power without warrant(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to
his right to be . . . in the United States;

....

...

(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary . . . to
board and search for aliens any vessel . . . conveyance, or vehicle . . .
and within . . . twenty-five miles from any such external boundary
to have access to private lands, but not dwellings . . . .
15. 8 C.F.R. 287.1(a)(2) (1977).This provision has been in effect without material
changes since 1947. 12 Fed. Reg. 2744 (1947)amended the then current regulation by
adding a section that defined "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary"
to mean "within a distance not exceeding 100 air miles from any external boundary."
16. In 1973 the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973).For facts and holding, see notes 25 & 27 and accompanying text infra.
17. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
18. Id. at 154.
19. In 1925 when the statement was made, immigration law did not provide for
searches and seizures away from the border. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
Customs search statutes, however, did authorize searches and seizures away from the
border. See notes 41-44and accompanying text infra.
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has been cited by circuit courts in validating immigration or customs searches both at and away from the border.20
Circuit courts consistently upheld the constitutionality of
warrantless immigration searches and seizures conduct& away
from the border within the 100 mile administrative limit.21The
justification for the searches and seizures, although not generally
articulated, appears to have been that the statutory authorization provided a presumption of reasonableness under the fourth
amendment.22While the probable cause requirement for warrants
was imposed on other warrantless searches and seizures to ensure
reasonableness, border searches conducted by customs or immigration officialswere treated as a statutory exception to a probable cause req~irernent.~~
Greater law enforcement discretion was
thus authorized for immigration and custom officials.
3. Almeida-Sanchez and its progeny

Current case law relies in part on distinctions between the
three basic modes of INS law enforcement operation away from
the border: First, permanent checkpoints are established where
major roads from the border converge; second, temporary check20. E.g., United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968);Thomas
v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1967).
21. E.g., United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973) (search for aliens upon reasonable suspicion is constitutional within a reasonable
distance of the border); United States v. Anderson, 468 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1972) (stop
and search for aliens within 100 air miles of border is reasonable); United States v.
McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973) (held search 7
miles from border to be reasonable as authorized but withheld blanket approval of the
100-mile limit); Mienke v. United States, 452 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1971) (immigration
searches within 100 miles of border do not violate fourth amendment); Fernandez v.
United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963) (stop for questioning within 100 miles was
constitutional); United States v. Correia, 207 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1953) (right to interrogate,
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(l) (1970), is constitutional); Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th
Cir. 1952) (search for aliens at checkpoint north of Florida Keys constitutional under the
1946 Act).
22. The general approach is best summarized by the Fifth Circuit's statement in
Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1952): "Obviously there is a strong
presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress, especially when the Act turns
on what is reasonable . . . ." But cf. United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cii),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (requiring reasonable suspicion to search); United States
v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973) (withheld
blanket approval of the 100-mile limit; some searches might not be reasonable); Au Yi
Lau v. United States Immig. & Nat. Serv., 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
864 (1971) (reasonable suspicion required for INS to forcibly stop and interrogate).
23. See generally Note, In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted by Federal
Customs and Immigration Officers, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.93 (1972); Comment,
Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALEL.J. 1007 (1968).
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points are periodically established on other roads near the border;
and third, roving patrols operate along roads that smugglers of
aliens may use to circumvent checkpoint^.^^ The fourth amendment protections applicable to these searches and seizures have
become a subject of increasing interest since the Supreme Court
first ruled on an INS search procedure away from the border.
In Almeida-Sanchez u. United States,25the Supreme Court
disallowed the exception to a probable cause requirement for a
warrantless immigration search by a roving patrol away from the
border. The government had claimed statutory justification for
the warrantless search without probable cause, relying on part of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952." The Court held
this statutory probable cause exception to be inconsistent with
the fourth amendment for searches occurring a t points away from
the border or its "functional equivalent^."^^
Several subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarifiedZ8and
extended traditional fourth amendment protections to other
immigration search and seizure situations. In United States v.
or ti^,^^ the Court extended the probable cause requirement announced for roving patrol searches in Almeida-Sanchez to permanent checkpoint searches away from the border." The same day,
the Court held in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce31that reasona24. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976).
25. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The border patrol stopped and searched a car without probable cause on a road twenty-five miles north of the border and parallel to it. Id. at 268.
(The circuit court opinion reported the distance as 50 miles.) The Ninth Circuit had
upheld the search as valid based on 8 U.S.C. 8 1357 (1970), the 100-mile distance outlined
by federal regulation, and its prior decisions. 452 F.2d 459, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1971).
26. The government relied on 8 U.S.C. 6 1357(a)(3) (1970). Note 14 supra.
27. "Whatever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search might
be, searches of this kind may in certain circumstances take place not only at the border
itself, but at its functional equivalents as well." 413 U.S. at 272.
Although functional equivalent was not defined, the Court gave two examples of
places away from the border that might be considered functional equivalents: An international airport and an established stop near the border where two or more roads from the
border converge. Id. at 273.
28. In United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), the Court declared that the
Almeida-Sanchez probable cause requirement was not to be applied retroactively to roving patrol searches. Id. at 534-35. In Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975), the
Almeida-Sanchez standard was held to be nonretroactive in relation to permanent checkpoint searches. Id. at 918-19.
29. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
30. Id. at 896-98. The Court again required the search to be at a functional equivalent
of the border for an exception to the probable cause standard. It did not articulate further
guidelines to determine functional equivalency. The search in Ortiz occurred a t the San
Clemente checkpoint. Id. at 896-97.
31. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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ble suspicion32was required to justify a stop for questioning by a
roving patrol." The stop, a seizure under the fourth amendment,
was limited to questioning about illegal alienage; no search was
involved. Among the many questions not yet addressedqby the
Supreme Court, and explicitly reserved in Ortiz,was that of the
applicable constitutional standards for stops a t permanent
checkpoints away from the border.34
The change in immigration search and seizure law requiring
some form of individualized suspicion (i.e., probable cause or
reasonable suspicion) for INS searches and stops for questioning
away from the border has generally not been liberally applied by
those circuit courts which, by virtue of their geographical locations along the southern border, deal with Mexican aliens. The
Fifth and Tenth Circuits have construed the Supreme Court decisions narrowly35and allowed checkpoint stops without individual32. The Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce called the standard "reasonable suspicion" and defined it as "specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from
those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion." Id. at 884. The circuit court decision
required "founded suspicion." 499 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1974). The two standards,
founded suspicion and reasonable suspicion, are equivalent. Both originate from the standard established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), sometimes referred to as articulable
suspicion.
33. 422 U.S. at 882-84. The stop was made by a patrol car near the San Clemente
checkpoint. The checkpoint was not operating due to inclement weather, and the patrol
car had picked out Brignoni-Ponce's car because its occupants were of Mexican ancestry.
Questioning revealed the occupants' illegal alienage. No challenge was made to the Ninth
Circuit's characterization of the stop as a roving patrol rather than a permanent checkpoint stop. Id. at 874-75. The Court also specifically declared that apparent Mexican
ancestry alone was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Id. at 886-87.
34. 422 U.S. at 897 n.3.
35. The Tenth Circuit limited the precedent's effect by characterizing functional
equivalency as a question of fact for the district courts. They found checkpoints 98 miles
from the border to be functional equivalents. United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353, 357-60
(10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Maddox, 485 F.2d 361, 363 (10th Cir. 1973).
Although the Fifth Circuit applied the probable-cause-to-search requirement of
Almeida-Sanchez to roving patrols and temporary checkpoints, United States v. Speed,
489 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 1052, rev'd 520 F.2d
322 (5th Cir. 1975), it declined to extend it to mobile checkpoints (those that alternate
between two and three fixed locations), United States v. Cantu, 504 F.2d 387, 389 (5th
Cir. 1974), or permanent checkpoints, United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.),
vacated, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975), aff'd,525 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1976) (after review in light of
Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce).
The Fifth Circuit further limited the Supreme Court decisions by analyzing the
search or seizure in two steps. The first was to ascertain whether the initial stop was
constitutionally valid. Then the subsequent search was examined for constitutional justification. If the initial stop was valid (as were checkpoint stops without reasonable suspicion), then a search for aliens did not require probable cause. United States v. Cantu, 510
F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1975). The court stated: "Once they had stopped the car, [valid under
the statute and 100-mile regulation,] they were empowered to search for aliens." Id. at
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ized s u ~ p i c i o nThe
. ~ ~ Ninth Circuit, however, has required a form
of individualized suspicion for all searches and seizures occurring
away from the border.37

B. T h e Reasonableness Standard of the Fourth Amendment
The recent concern of the courts with delineating constitutional safeguards for immigration searches away from the border
calls for a closer analysis of the protection guaranteed by the
Constitution. The text of the fourth amendment38establishes
both a substantive protection, that a citizen's right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and a procedural safeguard, that no warrant shall issue but upon
1004. Any search for contraband, however, required probable cause. United States v.
Santibanez, 517 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1975).
The Fifth Circuit continued to recognize searches for aliens at permanent checkpoints
without probable cause after Ortiz because the court determined the checkpoints to be
"functional equivalents." E.g., United States v. Hart, 525 F.2d 1199, 1200 (5th Cir. 1976)
(checkpoint was on the interstate 20 miles north of and parallel to the border). Accord,
United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 401 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex. 1975); United States v.
Fuentes, 379 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd mem., 517 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. United States v. Santibanez, 517 F.2d 922, 923 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973).
The constitutionality of checkpoint stops without founded suspicion continued to be
upheld by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Coffey, 520 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), after remand by the Supreme Court for consideration in light of Brignoni-Ponce
and Ortiz. 422 U.S. 1054, vacating 509 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1975) (mem.).
37. The Ninth Circuit required probable cause for checkpoint searches before the
Supreme Court's Ortiz decision by holding most permanent checkpoints not to be
"functional equivalents." See United States v. Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 422 U.S.
916 (1975). Functional equivalency was limited to locations "where virtually everyone
searched has just come from the other side of the border." 500 F.2d at 965.
Stops for questioning at checkpoints were sanctioned only upon founded suspicion.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974),aff'd, 422 U.S. 873 (1975);
United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974). The court did, however,
recognize stops if founded suspicion developed as a car "rolled through" a checkpoint.
United States v. Evans, 507 F.2d 879, 880 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057
(1975).
The court also invalidated a judicially authorized checkpoint warrant as violative of
the fourth amendment. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975),
reu'd, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Cf. United States v. Esquer-Rivera, 500 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974)
(stop a t a temporary checkpoint is unauthorized).
38. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST.amend. IV.
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probable cause. The substantive protection applies to all searches
and seizures: whether warrantless or authorized by a warrant,
they must be reasonable. The procedural requirement specifies
the standards for issuing a warrant that ensure the reasonableness of the search or seizure. While the fourth amendment's substantive protection is generally afforded in terms of the warrant
requirement, the Constitution does not mandate warrants in all
situations; it only prohiibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
The standard of reasonableness for warrantless searches and seizures is therefore not specified in the amendment but is left for
interpretation. The lack of clarity in this standard is aptly illustrated by the many warrantless INS search and seizure procedures that were once considered reasonable because of the statutes and regulations authorizing and defining them, but are now
reasonable only when additional protection is afforded by elements of the warrant requirement. Courts have generally required
that warrantless intrusions conform to one of the warrant requirements, the probable cause standard, in order to ensure reasonab l e n e ~ sFor
. ~ ~this reason, the probable cause and reasonableness
standards have come to be regarded by many as equivalents.
It is not axiomatic, however, that the substantive protection
in warrantless situations should be ensured by the same procedural safeguards required for warrants. The historical setting,
recent scholarship, and some judicial authority all support the
position that the fourth amendment's procedural protections,
particularly probable cause, are not always necessary for a reasonable warrantless search or seizure.
1.

The historical setting and congressional enactments

The authors of the fourth amendment apparently considered
certain warrantless searches to be reasonable without probable
cause. A customs search statute authorizing a warrantless search
based only upon the customs officer's belief that goods subject to
duty were on board a shipd0was passed by the same Congress that
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,51 (1970);
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,101-02 (1959);Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
149, 154 (1925).
40. The Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790), authorized
customs officials to search any ship in which they had "reason to suspect" goods subject
to duty were concealed. The Act specified issue of a warrant on oath or aflkmation if they
had "cause to suspect" the goods were concealed in a "particular" building or dwelling.
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resolved to submit the Bill of Rights to the states for ratificatione41
This statute was replaced in 1790 by another statute with expanded provisions not even requiring the officer's belief." Similar
customs search authorization, including some expansions, has
continued to the present.43
Passage of the first customs statute by the same Congress
that drafted the Bill of Rights, when viewed in light of English
writs of assistance," argues persuasively against applying warrant
requirements to all warrantless searches and seizures. These writs
of assistance were general area warrants, and their use has been
widely recognized as one of the primary grievances leading to the
American R e v o l ~ t i o nThe
. ~ ~ probable cause and particularity requirements outlined in the fourth amendment for warrants were
designed to protect citizens from the abuses of these writs. Although the first customs act passed by Congress authorized warrantless searches conditioned only on the officer's belief that
goods subject to duty were on the ship, Congress apparently considered the problem of a general area warrant to be eliminated
by limiting these warrantless searches to vessels. In order to
search buildings or dwellings for goods subject to duties, the statute required a warrant meeting what later became fourth amendment standards.46
Statutory authorization for warrantless searches and seizures
at the border on less than probable cause has not been limited to
41. A joint resolution, passed by two-thirds of both houses of Congress, proposed
twelve articles, ten of them forming our current Bill of Rights, to be ratified by the state
legislatures as constitutional amendments. Resolution, 1 Stat. 97 (1789). The ten were
ratified by 1791. Amendments to the Constitution, 1 Stat. 21, n.a (1789).
42. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, $ 31, 1 Stat. 145 (repealed 1799).
43. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627 (repealed 1922). Section 54 contained
essentially the same provisions as 6 31 of the 1790Act. Section 46 of the statute authorized
the discretionary search of a person's baggage when he arrived in the country. Sections
105 and 106 also extended these powers to entries made in the western districts by vessels,
boats, and carriages. The Act of Mar. 3,1815, ch. 94, 6 2,3 Stat. 231 (expired 1822), made
the powers more explicit for land travel and specifically stated a warrant was not necessary.
Current statutory authority allows search of persons and baggage pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, Tariff Act of 1930,19 U.S.C. 6 1582 (1970),
and search of vessels, vehicles, and beasts, when the officers suspect goods subject to duty,
19 U.S.C. 6 482 (1970) (Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 6 3, 14 Stat. 178).
44. These writs authorized constables to break and enter houses, shops and any
"other place" to seize prohibited or uncustomed goods. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, 6 5 (1662).
But see Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THEERAOF TIB
AMERICANREVOLUTION40, 43-49 (R. Morris ed. 1939). Dickerson argues that the practice,
not the statute, made the writs "general warrants."
45. Dickerson, supra note 44, at 40.
46. See note 40 supra.
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customs searches. Similar broad authority has been granted for
immigration searches and seizures." Throughout its history, Congress has neither required a warrant nor considered probable
cause necessary to ensure reasonableness in customs and immigration searches and seizures of statutorily limited scope.
2. Judicial authority and the reasonableness standard for

warrantless searches and seizures
The judiciary has also treated the reasonableness standard
as partially independent of the warrant requirements in certain
warrantless situations when legitimate law enforcement interests
would be impaired by adherence to that standard. In Terry u.
Ohio,48 the Supreme Court created the "reasonable suspicion"
standard based on the fourth amendment's reasonableness language for a specific factual setting, stop and frisk, where both a
warrant and probable cause were considered inappropriate." This
lesser standard of individualized suspicion also required judicial
limitations on the extent of the intrusion to ensure reasonableness; judicial review of the facts against an objective standard
was still required to ensure meaningful application of the fourth
amendment protections. Brignoni-Ponce extended the reasonable
suspicion standard to another warrantless law enforcement procedure, a stop for questioning by a roving patrol.
In addition to the Supreme Court decisions applying the
lesser standard of reasonable suspicion to certain warrantless situations, some members of the Court have stressed the importance
of looking beyond the warrant requirements to the reasonableness
requirement in order to give greater recognition to law enforcement needs. Chief Justice Burger, for example, opined:
Perhaps these decisions [Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz] will
be seen in perspective as but another example of a society seemingly impotent to deal with massive lawlessness. In that sense
history may view us as prisoners of our own traditional and
appropriate concern for individual rights, unable- or unwilling-to apply the concept of reasonableness explicit in the
Fourth Amendment in order to develop a rational accommodation between those rights and the literal safety of the country.50
47.
48.
49.
50.

See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. a t 8-9, 21-22, 30-31.
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. a t 899 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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State and lower federal courts have also authorized certain
seizures without probable cause when the law enforcement interest is sufficient. Stopping automobiles a t roadblockss1and various
checkpointss2has been judicially recognized as reasonable despite
the intrusion on many innocent travelers. The requirement that
all vehicles stop is one of the factors that courts have sometimes
considered to ensure reasonableness in these situation^.^^ Additional protection is afforded by limiting the extent of the stop;
probable cause has been required for intrusions exceeding the
authorized purpose of the stop.54
On the other hand, this concern for law enforcement interests
has sometimes resulted in a dilution of the fourth amendment
probable cause requirement for warrants. This divorce of probable cause from the reasonableness requirement for warrants evidences confusion in the application of the fourth amendment's
substantive and procedural protections. In Camara v. Municipal
Court,55for instance, the Supreme Court required a warrant for
administrative housing inspections. The Court distorted the
probable cause requirement, however, because that requirement
was considered satisfied simply upon showing the reasonableness
of the search.56This reasonableness involved no individualized
suspicion. In addition, the Camara warrant can be issued for an
area as well as a specific dwelling and thus presents an apparent
conflict with the fourth amendment's mandate that a "warrant

(

51. E.g., United States v. Millar, 543 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1976) (roadblock for drivers
license check on freeway); United States v. Jenkins, 528 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1975) (random
stops for drivers license checks); City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959)
(roadblock for drivers license check); People v. Euctice, 371 Ill. 159, 20 N.E.2d 83 (1939)
(roadblock immediately following felony commission); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355
S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962) (roadblock for license and registration check); Williams v. State,
226 Md. 614, 174 A.2d 719 (1961) (roadblock after felony commission).
52. E.g., Stephensonv. Department of Agr. & Consum. Servs., 329 So. 2d 373 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (agriculture inspection station for trucks).
53. See, e.g., id. at 377; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (Ky.
1962).
54. See, e.g., Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 504, 193 P.2d 470, 474 (1948)
(general search for evidence of crimes by roadblock without a warrant is illegal); City of
Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784, 788-89 (Fla. 1959) (stop for license check does not
convey power to search); Stephenson v. Department of Agr. & Consum. Servs., 329 So.
2d 373, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (statute required consent or warrant for a search);
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686,687 (Ky. 1962) (stops cannot have an ulterior
motive). Cf. United States v. Millar, 543 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 1976) (probable
cause, developed after the stop, justified the issuance of a warrant to search trailer).
55. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
56. The Court stated: "But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid
public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue
a suitably restricted search warrant." Id. a t 539.
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shall issue" only upon probable cause supported by a particularized description of the subject of the search or seizure.57This
holding particularly illustrates confusion over the fourth amendment's protections because it overruled Supreme Court precedent
that administrative housing inspections (searches) were reasonable without a warrant.58
3. Recent scholarship

Legal commentators have recognized the difference between
the warrant and reasonableness requirements of the fourth
amendment. The differences between warrant and warrantless
situations are considered to be important for application of these
fourth amendment standards. Historically there has been a shift
of emphasis on these standards. The concern a t the time of the
drafting of the fourth amendment was with overly general warrants, not with warrantless searches and seizures.59Thus, current
reliance on the warrant as a "touchstone" of reasonableness
under the fourth amendment has caused one scholar to claim that
the courts have "stood the Fourth Amendment on its head."60
Ironically, the warrant requirements, originally imposing a more
rigorous control on the issuance of a warrant, have been eviscerated in some warrant situations to meet law enforcement needs,
while the warrant requirements have been applied to other situations (that were originally reasonable without warrants) in derogation of law enforcement interests.
In an attempt to establish sound doctrine for searches or
seizures both with and without a warrant, legal scholars have
pointed to the importance of the distinction between the fourth
amendment's warrant and reasonableness requirements. While
legal commentators acknowledge the historical reversal from protection from warrants to protection by warrants," they are di57. For the complete text of the fourth amendment, see note 38 supra.
In Martinez-Fuerte the Court suggests that the greater intrusion on privacy when
searching a private residence and the traditional warrant requirement for such searches
may have been the reason for the Court requiring a warrant in Camara. 428 U.S. 564-65.
58. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). The dissent in Camara claimed that
the decision was a prostitution of the fourth amendment and that better protection would
be afforded if it were authorized as a reasonable warrantless search. 387 US. at 546-55
(Clark, J., dissenting).
59. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
60. T. TAYLOR,
Two STUDIES
IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
23-24, 38-46 (1969).
61. E.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.L. REV. 349,
367 (1974).
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vided on the appropriate application of the reasonableness doctrine to warrantless intrusion^?^ One suggestion, a sliding scale
of safeguards that vary with the intrusiveness of the search or
seizure, holds some promise,63but harbors potential problems.64
In spite of the diversity of recommendations, scholars generally
consider a greater focus on the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement independent of the warrant requirements to be
desirable. 65

In the instant case, the Court defined the protection afforded
by the fourth amendment as freedom from arbitrary and oppressive interference into privacy and personal security by law endeclared that weighing the public interforcement official~,~%nd
est against the fourth amendment interests of the individual is
the procedure to be followed in establishing constitutional safeguard~.~'
This balancing was used to resolve the question whether
to require reasonable suspicion to validate the stop for questioning, a seizure under the fourth amendment? The Court found a
strong public interest in authorizing stops without reasonable
suspicion, since the traffic on major routes is too heavy for an
officer to have more than a brief opportunity to observe any single
car and develop the requisite suspicion. Thus, the checkpoint's
deterrent effect on smugglers of aliens would be lost if reasonable
suspicion were required? In addition, the Court noted that while
such stops intrude on a right to free passage and, to a more
limited extent, on the right to personal security, the magnitude
of this intrusion is less than for roving patrol stops.70
62. One scholar recommends categorizing searches and seizures by fact situation so
SEARCH
AND SEIZURE:
A
that standards of reasonableness can be delineated. E. GRISWOLD,
DILEMMA
OF THE SUPREME
COURT
47-52 (1975). Another proposes administrative rules by
police departments that outline procedures for searches and seizures that are reviewed for
reasonableness. Amsterdam, supra note 61, at 416-17.
63. See Amsterdam, supra note 61, a t 390-93.
supra note 62, at 39-42.
64. See id. at 375-76, 393-94. See also E. GRISWOLD,
65. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 61, at 414-18; E. GRISWOLD,
supra note 62,
supra note 60, at 46-50.
at 49-52; T. TAYLOR,
66. 428 U.S. at 554. The Court supported this definition by citing Brignoni-Ponce,
Ortiz, and Camara.
67. 428 U.S. at 555. As authority for the balancing analysis, the Court cited BrignoniPonce and Terry and described the balancing and resultant protections used in AlmeidaSanchez and Brignoni-Ponce.
68. 428 U.S. at 556.
69. Id. at 556-57. For the facts the Court relied upon to establish the magnitude of
the illegal alien problem, see id. at 551-54.
70. Id. at 557-60. While the objective intrusion is the same, the Court considered the
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In delineating the constitutional protections required, the
Court declared that "some quantum of individualized suspicion
is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure. But
the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of
such suspi~ion."~~
The Court granted wide discretion to the field
officers in selectively referring cars to the secondary inspection
area a t San Clemente, noting that even if the referrals made are
based upon apparent Mexican ancestry, there is no constitutional
v i o l a t i ~ nThe
. ~ ~individual's protection was guaranteed by limitations on the intrusiveness of the stop and the nature and location
of the checkpoint. The Court relied on the fact that location of
fixed checkpoints is a high level administrative decision in which
factors such as inconvenience to the public are on side red.'^ The
Court rejected the argument for a warrant requirementr4because
the stop had sufficient constitutional protections without a warrant75and did not involve the search of a dwelling?
difference in the subjective intrusion between a checkpoint and a roving patrol to be a
significant distinction. The elements of this subjective intrusion were described as concern
over authority to stop, fright, and surprise. Id. at 558-59. The stigmatizing effect, occurring when only a few cars are referred for secondary questioning a t the San Clemente
checkpoint, was considered not to involve fright but to actually further some fourth
amendment protections by minimizing the intrusion on others. Id. at 560. The Court saw
a minimized intrusion as being a furtherance rather than a violation of protection. The
dissent viewed this as a convolution of fourth amendment guarantees. Id. at 572 n.2
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted). For authority the Court cited Camara, where
area warrants were authorized without particularized knowledge of individual dwellings.
72. 428 U S . at 563. The Court's reasoning was that due to the minimal intrusion not
requiring individual justification, wide discretion was necessary. The Court accepted the
government's assertion that apparent Mexican ancestry is not the sole criterion for referral
and supported this by figures indicating far fewer cars are referred for questioning than
would contain persons of Mexican ancestry based on population percentages in Southern
California. Id. at n.16.
The dissent points out that this fails to take into account the percentage of the
population with apparent Mexican ancestry that drive cars as compared to the population
a t large. This arbitrariness and potential discrimination is challenged by the dissent as
being unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. a t 571-73 & n.4.
73. Id. at 559, 565-66. The Court also emphasized the possibility of poststop judicial
review of checkpoint location as an additional safeguard.
74. The Ninth Circuit decision dealt entirely with the warrant issue. See note 37
supra. Sifuentes used the warrant requirement as an alternate theory to attack the constitutionality of the stop in this case. 428 US. at 564.
75. 428 U.S. at 565-66. The protections of a warrant considered to be already provided
were assurance of authority, control of officer discretion, and prevention of hindsight
distorting the reasonableness evaluation.
76. Id. This factual difference was used to distinguish the case from Camara. See
notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra. The fourth amendment has been held to provide greater protection of homes than automobiles. McDonald v. United States, 335 U S .
451 (1948).
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The instant case marks a reversal in the Court's trend to
require either probable cause for warrantless searches or reasonable suspicion for warrantless stops by the INS away from an
international border. Although there is some justification for this
different treatment because the seizure in the instant case is either less intrusive or made under more controlled conditions than
the immigration searches or seizures previously considered by the
Court, the absence of a requirement of individualized suspicion
in this case raises important questions about both the nature of
an individual's fourth amendment guarantee and the appropriate
procedural safeguards to ensure the inviolability of that guarantee in warrantless situations.
Accordingly, this case note will focus on certain fourth
amendment procedural standards of protection and on analytical
frameworks for determining the reasonableness of these standards." The analysis will first examine the efficacy of two alternative procedural requirements that the Court could have applied
to ensure the reasonableness of interrogatory checkpoint stops
under the fourth amendment. Next, it will analyze the Court's
balancing approach and show that this method of determining
reasonableness fails to ensure the inviolability of individual
fourth amendment rights. Finally, an alternative analytical
framework for determining reasonableness will be proposed that
ensures protection of these individual rights without unnecessarily hindering law enforcement interests.

A. Alternative Procedural Requirements to Ensure
Reasonableness
I.

The checkpoint warrant proposal

A checkpoint warrant is a general warrant authorizing seizures a t a specific checkpoint for a limited period of time. The
warrant is issued after review by a federal magistrate of an INS
affidavit setting forth the grounds for suspecting illegal aliens in
the traffic passing through that checkpoint? This area warrant
77. This case note will not address the questions raised by the decision concerning
which situations should be included in the Court's holding (i.e., temporary checkpoints,
nonimmigration checkpoints) or the necessary limitations and clarification that should
come from future decisions.
78. For details of the procedure, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308,
310-12 (9th Cir. 1975), rev 'd, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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requires no individualized probable cause, but rests any protection it affords on the judicial officer's conclusion that the probable incidence of immigration violations at the checkpoint justifies
stops for questioning.
The Court had ample authority for sanctioning a checkpoint
warrant procedure. A warrant had been issued for the San Clemente che~kpoint,'~
and the warrant requirement was urged as an
alternative by defendant S i f u e n t e ~Such
. ~ ~ a procedure first found
expression in Camarasl for administrative housing inspections
and was recommended in Almeida-Sanchez by Justice Powell as
an alternative in the context of immigration searches and seizure~.~~
The Court, however, rejected a checkpoint warrant in the
instant case, claiming that fourth amendment rights could be
protected without it. The Court distinguished Camara, g3 in that
79. A copy of the "warrant of inspection" is set forth in full in the circuit court's
opinion. 514 F.2d at 311 n.2.
The warrant was not a requirement mandated by the courts. The rationale for obtaining the warrant appears to have been the Ninth Circuit's statement in United States v.
Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1974), requiring a permanent checkpoint search to be
based on probable cause. This attempt to justify checkpoint operation by a warrant was
apparently premature because the Supreme Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for the
statement. The decision in Bowen allowed the checkpoint search because the standard of
Almeida-Sanchez was held to be nonretroactive. The Bowen court, however, also decided
that absent probable cause permanent checkpoint stops and searches would be unconstitutional under Almeida-Sanchez. For a discussion of the Almeida-Sanchez standard, see
text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the decision,
it chastized the Ninth Circuit for deciding the latter issue because the nonretroactivity
holding was sufficient to dispose of the case. Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916, 92021 (1975). In any event, the warrant failed to survive judicial review in the Ninth Circuit.
514 F.2d at 332.
80. Note 74 and accompanying text supra.
81. Notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
82. Such a warrant procedure was outlined as a possibilityfor roving patrols. 413 U.S.
a t 283-84 (concurring opinion). Justice Powell proposed the warrant as a way to balance
legitimate government needs and constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 275. He then
suggested four criteria to consider in issuing the warrant: First, known or reasonably
believed frequency of illegal alien traffic; second, proximity to the border; third, geographical considerations; and fourth, probable degree of interference with rights of innocent
persons. Id. at 283-84.
The area warrant proposal received support from legal writers following AlmeidaSanchez. See, e.g., Leahy, Border Patrol Checkpoint Operation Under Warrants of Inspection: The Wake of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 5 CAL.W. INT'LL.J. 62, 63-67, 6970 (1974); Note, Fourth Amendment Applications to Searches Conducted by Immigration
Oficials, 38 ALB.L. REV. 962,975 (1974); Note, The Extent of the Border, 1HAST.CONST.
L.Q. 235, 245-50 (1974); 27 VAND.L. REV. 523, 534-35 (1974). But see Note, AlmeidaSanchez and Its Progeny: The Developing Border Zone Search Law, 17 ARIZ.L. REV.214,
242-47 (1975); Note, Area Search Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 YALEL.J. 355, 361-71 (1974).
83. See notes 55-57 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
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the seizure in the instant case did not involve the search of a
dwelling and the notification function of a warrantB4was not
needed. More importantly in the present context, the Court considered judicial review of the administrative decision on checkpoint location to be a sufficient substitute for judicial review of
field officer's d i s c r e t i ~ n . ~ ~
While the Court's latter reason attempts to satisfy a well
known purpose of the warrant requirement, mere review of checkpoint location will not fully control law enforcement discretion.
There are two types of discretion involved in border patrol stops
for questioning: Discretion as to where cars are stopped and discretion as to which cars are stopped. The Court's protection removes the former from absolute law enforcement control, but the
decision eliminates arbitrarinessB6in the exercise of the latter only
when all cars are stopped. At San Clemente there was no administrative or judicial control of field officer discretion in selecting
the cars to be stopped. An area warrant would likewise fail to
eliminate arbitrariness in the exercise of this discretion, since it
does not control the manner of checkpoint operation.
Furthermore, while the Court properly rejected the area warrant procedure, its reasons for doing so overlooked the fundamental flaw with an area warrant: Such a warrant ignores the fourth
amendment's procedural warrant requirements that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." Probable cause and particularity are individualized
requirements that are violated by the general authorization pro84. One of the purposes of a warrant established by the Court in Camara was to
assure the citizen that the inspector was duly authorized to inspect and to define for the
citizen the limits of the inspection. 387 U.S. a t 532-33. This notification function appears
to take on greater significance when the warrant is issued on less than traditional probable
cause.
The notification function was performed a t the checkpoint by the officers' uniforms
and the clearly visible signs. 428 U.S. a t 546, 565.
85. This view represents a change in the Court's position, since the Court in AlmeidaSanchez was particularly concerned with field officer discretion. 413 U.S. at 270. For a
discussion of the judicial control necessary to curb this discretion, see Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-51 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948).
86. The primary concern of courts in warrantless searches and seizures has been the
evil of unbridled law enforcement discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97
(1964).
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vided by an area-type ~ a r r a n t . Authorizing
~'
such a warrant
would maintain the confusion between the fourth amendment's
substantive reasonableness guarantee and the procedural probable cause requirement-a confusion that has beset the courts for
years." The area warrant is thus a step in the direction of writs
of a s s i s t a n ~ e . ~ ~
2.

The individualized suspicion requirement

An alternative safeguard the Court could have applied is an
individualized suspicion requirement. Mandating individualized
suspicion in permanent checkpoint stops would have been the
next logical step in the Court's trend of requiring individual justification for INS searches and seizures away from the border?
This would require a field officer to justify the stop of any particular car by articulable suspicious facts and resulting inferences.
Both types of law enforcement discretion would be controlled
by this requirement. Individual justification of each stop eliminates the arbitrariness from discretionary selection of cars. Moreover, judicial review of law enforcement discretion in locating
checkpoints ensures that the location is reasonable. While a
checkpoint still involves some intrusion on the rights of innocent
motorists, the inconvenience of driving through the checkpoint is
not arbitrary because of congressional authorization and judicial
review.
The Court declined to apply an individualized suspicion requirement because it found both law enforcement and individual
interests to be different for permanent checkpoint stops than for
stops made by a roving patrol." Individual interests a t permanent
checkpoints were found to be different because checkpoint stops
are subjectively less intrusiveg2than roving patrol stops; furthermore, the permanence of checkpoint location is a partial restraint
on arbitrariness. Law enforcement interests at permanent checkpoints were perceived to be more compelling, since the checkpoints are central to all INS enforcement procedures away from
the border. These interests were considered to be significant
87. See generally Note, Area Search Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez
and Camara, 84 YALEL.J. 355 (1974).
88. See notes 39, 44-45, 55-58, & 60 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
90. The dissent urged this requirement. 428 U.S. at 574-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. For an argument that the Court's factual analysis on these points was the main
flaw in the opinion, see 14 SANDIEGOL. REV. 257 (1976).
92. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
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enough in the checkpoint context to obviate application of the
more stringent reasonable suspicion standard applied in the roving patrol situation.g3Moreover, a reasonable suspicion would be
harder to develop at a checkpoint than on roving patrol because
officers only view the car as it makes a fleeting stop."g4Further,
it appears that no lesser standard of individualized suspicion
could have been established to provide constitutional protectiong5
and still permit operation of the c h e c k p ~ i n t Since
. ~ ~ the Court
- -

-

-

-

-

93. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
94. This raises the question whether or not a "fleeting stop" or a "roll-through" would
be a seizure and subject to fourth amendment scrutiny. There was a factual dispute as to
whether or not a "fleeting stop" was made in the instant case. The Court assumed it to
be a seizure. 428 U.S. at 546 n.1. The Ninth Circuit had recognized stops based on founded
suspicion developed as cars "rolled through" a checkpoint. United States v. Evans, 507
F.2d 879, 880 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
95. An individualized suspicion standard must be objective if judicial review is to
ensure constitutional protection. When the Court established the reasonable suspicion
standard in Terry it declared:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that a t some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws
can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that
the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate?
392 U.S. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
This objective control is required to give protection similar to a warrant or probable
cause determination that requires a neutral judicial officer. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-51 (1971).
In order to be a lesser standard of individualized suspicion, the standard could only
be authorization of the stop on more tenuous articulable facts. But the more tenuous the
facts, the closer it approximates unfettered discretion. One potential lesser standard that
illustrates this difficulty is reliance on apparent Mexican ancestry. While Mexican ancestry is relevant to illegal alienage along the southern border, the majority of people with
such ancestry are citizens or legal aliens and would be subjected to these seizures arbitrarily. Thus, this standard would not curb arbitrariness any more than leaving the discretion
with the field officer. Reliance on Mexican ancestry alone has universally been held
insufficient for establishing founded suspicion. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975); United States v. Del Bosque, 523 F.2d 1251, 1252 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1136 (1974); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1973).
In the instant case, the majority condoned referrals to the secondary questioning area
made "largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry." 428 U.S. a t 563. Since no
justification was required for checkpoint stops, no facts needed to be relied on and the
Mexican ancestry dictum was not essential to the Court's opinion. The majority implicitly
recognized the inadequacy of such grounds by attempting to mitigate concern with reliance on Mexican ancestry by quoting statistics to demonstrate such ancestry was not the
only basis for referral. Id. a t 562-64 nn. 15 & 17. The dissent took particular exception to
this part of the opinion and pointed out many of the inadequacies and dangers of reliance
on Mexican ancestry. Id. a t 573 & n.4.
96. The checkpoint ceased operation after the Ninth Circuit held the checkpoint

466

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(1977:

found the illegal alien problem to be serious, a loss of the deterrent effect that permanent checkpoints have on alien-smuggling
operationsg7was considered to be too high a price for the protection that reasonable suspicion would afford individual rights.
While an individualized suspicion requirement protects individual rights and marshalls much judicial precedent, the Court
properly recognized that it is not mandated by the Constitution."
Although the fourth amendment's warrant requirements of probable cause and particularity require individualized justification,
the reasonableness requirement for warrantless situations makes
no such demand. Theoretically, any control on law enforcement
action that would guarantee a person's security against unreasonable searches and seizures could satisfy the reasonableness requirement for warrantless intrusions without individualized suspicion. Thus an individualized suspicion requirement is a part of
the reasonableness protection for warrantless searches and seizures only when necessary to ensure individual rights.

B. The Court's Balancing Analysis
One analytical framework the Court has used to determine
the reasonableness of warrantless searches and seizures is the
balancing of public interests against individual interests." The
objective of this balancing analysis is to determine which procedural requirements should apply to the search or seizure. In previous decisions, this balancing analysis has resulted in procedures
that are outgrowths of the fourth amendment's procedural warrant requirements. loo
The balancing analysis in the instant case, however, resulted
warrant to be invalid and required founded suspicion. Bernsen, Search and Seizure on the
Highway for Immigration Violations: A Survey of the Law, 13 SANDIEGOL. REV.69, 73
(1975) (Bernsen is General Counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization Service).
97. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
98. See 428 U.S. at 561. The traditional viewpoint has been that reasonableness is
equivalent to probable cause or an individualized suspicion variant in warrantless situations. This viewpoint is reflected in the dissent's accusation that the majority decision
"empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Id. at 568.
99. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). Accord,
United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960,973 (9th Cir. 1974) (Wallace, J., dissenting); United
States v. Fuentes, 379 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd mem., 517 F.2d 1401
(5th Cir. 1975).
100. Brignoni-Ponce and Terry imposed the reasonable suspicion standard. Notes 4850 and accompanying text supra. Although Camara did not require individualized suspicion as a result of the balancing, it did require the formalities of a warrant. Notes 55-56
and accompanying text supra.
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in a determination that no individualized suspicion was required
to ensure reasonableness. The Court did not denominate its analysis as a determination of reasonableness but simply declared
that constitutional safeguards were determined by weighing "the
public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the
individual."101The balance struck in the instant case was the first
time the Court has permitted a warrantless intrusion without any
of the procedural safeguards required for warrants.lo2This pure
reasonableness determination relies on checkpoint location and
limitations on the extent of the seizure's intrusiveness to guarantee constitutional rights.
While the Court's determination reflects the realization that
a reasonableness determination does not automatically dictate
the infusion of aspects of probable cause, the method it adopted
in determining reasonableness fails to guarantee individual rights
as the Court defined them in the instant case. The Court stated
that the amendment's guarantee "prevent[s] arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of i n d i ~ i d u a l s . ' 'This
~ ~ ~ widely articulated
standard104is in harmony with the acknowledged purpose of the
amendment to control unfettered law enforcement discretion.lo5
The difficulty with the Court's analysis is that the resulting controls on the extent of intrusiveness ensure that the seizure is not
oppressive but do not control arbitrariness. Oppressiveness is curtailed by confining the stop to brief questioning concerning the
motorist's right to be in the country and requiring probable cause
to justify further inquiry or search.lo6But the only control on
arbitrariness is the nature of permanent checkpoint operation
and location. Judicial review of this administrative decision fails
to control the arbitrariness involved in selecting any given car for
questioning.
The efficacy of judicial review as a control on discretion is
seriously impaired by the precedent established in this case. If
the San Clemente checkpoint, located on the freeway between
101. 428 U.S. at 555.
102. See id. at 556.
103. Id. at 554.
104. Similar language was used to define the protected right in United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,895 (1975), United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,878 (1975),
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,528 (1967), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 767 (1966), and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
105. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
106. See 428 U.S. 557-60, 566-67.
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two of California's largest cities is reasonable, it is unlikely that
any checkpoint location within the 100-milelimit can be successfully challenged. While the location was chosen to minimize interference with traffic along the route,lo7the traffic volume is so
large that only a small percentage of the cars can be stopped by
referring them to a secondary questioning area.lo8Because the
discretion of field officers in selecting cars is unlimited, there is
no control on arbitrariness. On the other hand, had the decision
been limited to approval of the Sarita checkpoint, the precedent
would not have condoned such arbitrariness for the simple reason
that the Sarita checkpoint involved the stop of every car.
The Court justified this unfettered discretion by weighing
oppressiveness against arbitrariness: "As the intrusion here is
sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to
justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol Officers must
have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted for
the brief questioning involved."109Although the Court claimed
this advanced fourth amendment protections by subjecting fewer
people to the stops and facilitating traffic flow,l1° it distorted its
definition of the individual's protected interest. Thus, the balancing analysis is valid only if the Court foregoes its own definition
of the individual's fourth amendment rights or holds those rights
to be violable.
Establishing reasonableness by balancing interests has the
danger that individual rights may be extinguished by a strong
public interest. Admittedly the public interest in this case is
strong because of the extent of the illegal alien problemlll and the
possibility that the checkpoint would cease operation if a more
stringent standard had been required.l12 Yet the fourth amendment guarantees that the "right" (not merely an interest) to be
-

107. Id. a t 562 n.15.
108. In an eight-day period, 146,000 cars passed through the checkpoint, only 820
were referred for questioning, and 171 contained illegal aliens. Id. a t 554.
109. Id. at 563-64.
110. Id. a t 560. The dissent claimed that such a rationale failed to consider freedom
from intrusion to be the norm and thus "stands the Fourth Amendment on its head." Id.
a t 572 n.2.
111. The illegal alien problem is serious. In fiscal year 1963 the INS apprehended
38,361 deportable aliens. By 1973 the number had risen to 498,123. United States v. Baca,
368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (S.D. Cal. 1973). By 1975 the number of deportable aliens apprehended had risen to 596,796, of which 579,448 were Mexican aliens. [I9751 INS ANN.REP.
103.
The San Clemente checkpoint alone apprehends approximately 17,000 illegal aliens
per year. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
112. See note 96 supra.

4471

CASE NOTES

469

secure from unreasonable searches and seizures "shall not be violated." To define reasonableness as the weighing of personal
against public interests will not ensure inviolability. If arbitrariness is an evil of unreasonable searches and seizures, as the Court
suggests,l13the balancing in this decision failed to cure that evil.
Acknowledgement of law enforcement interests should not result
in abrogation of fourth amendment rights.l14This possible erosion
of individual rights argues strongly against a determination of
reasonableness by weighing individual interest against public interests. 115

C . An Alternative Proposal to Determine Reasonableness
A close analysis suggests that reasonableness under the
fourth amendment has two aspects: First, the reasonableness of
authorizing the search or seizure without a warrant; and second,
the reasonableness of the search or seizure procedural safeguards.
The essence of the proposed analytical framework is to examine
each of these questions separately and thereby segregate the impacts of public and individual interests in the reasonableness
determination. The first examination takes public law enforcement interest into account in determining whether a warrant is
required. The second takes the individual's fourth amendment
right into account by scrutinizing the search or seizure procedural
requirements to ascertain whether sufficient safeguards are present to guarantee that right. The consideration of public interest
and individual rights in separate reasonableness determinations
ensures that public interest cannot extinguish individual rights
in the balance.
113. See notes 86 & 103-04 and accompanying text supra.
114. The Court refused to abridge constitutional rights for law enforcement necessity
in Almeida-Sanchez. "The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the
Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It
is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards." 413 U S . a t 273.
In United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U S . 916 (1975),
the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning: "[Tlhe government argues that fixedcheckpoint searches, even if not the functional equivalent of border searches, should be
upheld simply because they are urgently needed. . . . The short answer to this argument,
however, is that necessity alone cannot override the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 967.
115. This possible erosion is undoubtedly one of the reasons many argue for the
equivalency of reasonableness and warrant requirements for warrantless searches and
seizures. Individualized suspicion requires articulable reasons for incursions on any individual's rights. Such reasons are subject to review by a neutral magistrate to ensure that
the facts and resulting inferences were reasonable. With this impartial review, the individual rights are not as susceptible to extinction by considerations of public interest.
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The examination of the reasonableness of authorizing a
search or seizure without a warrant should begin by recognizing
that a warrant should be required whenever feasible. If requiring
a warrant defeats law enforcement interests, Congress or the
courts could authorize a reasonable search or seizure without it.
But if a warrant requirement is only an inconvenience to law
enforcement objectives, reasonableness would demand a warrant.
Clearly, any search or seizure pursuant to a warrant is still subject to the reasonableness requirement for procedural safeguards.
Provided the intrusion is not unreasonable per se,l16 the procedural requirements mandated by the Constitution, probable
cause and particularity, will ensure reasonableness. Since these
requirements always apply to a warrant, area or general warrants
are precluded. Thus, a properly issued warrant will provide adequate protection of individual rights.
Warrantless searches and seizures, however, demand closer
analysis of the reasonableness of procedural safeguards. Since no
procedure is specifically mandated, courts should scrutinize
available procedures to ensure that an individual's fourth amendment rights are not abrogated. This necessitates clearly ascertaining the substance of this right."' Freedom from arbitrary and
oppressive intrusions on privacy and personal security, the definition the Court used in the instant case, establishes a substantial
and well-recognized standard.l18
The procedural safeguards necessary to ensure reasonableness will be more stringent as the oppressiveness or the arbitrariness of the intrusion increases. Although increasing the strictness
of the standard in proportion to the extent of intrusion suggests
the potential for endless classification,llg it appears that warrantless searches and seizures could easily be limited by the courts to
three categories.
The first category includes searches and seizures which, absent exigent circumstances, would require a warrant. An example
116. A search or seizure that is unreasonable per se would be one that "shocks the
conscience" of the court. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.165, 172 (1952) (administration
of an emetic to recover swallowed capsules).
117. Since the precise nature of an individual's right is not explicit in the language
of the amendment, it must be divined by the Court. Any concrete characterization of the
right guaranteed by the fourth amendment is therefore fraught with peril. But this has
not been and should not be an insurmountable barrier. If the definition becomes inadequate to fully protect individual rights, it can be rectified by the Court through a more
careful delineation of the standard.
118. See notes 103-04 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
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is the stop and search of a moving vehicle.120 Such intrusions
should be strictly held to the probable cause requirement to protect individual fourth amendment rights. The second category of
searches and seizures, represented by the brief detention and frisk
in Terry or the roving patrol stop for questioning in BrignoniPonce, is of sufficiently limited intrusiveness that the reasonable
suspicion standard would prevent arbitrary and oppressive intrusions. The third category involves searches or seizures of yet more
limited intrusiveness such that those limitations on intrusiveness, combined with controls on the circumstances under which
the search or seizure is permitted, are sufficient to preclude arbitrariness and oppressiveness. In this third category, individualized suspicion would not be required. Under this analysis, law
enforcement interests are given greater effect than under an inflexible requirement of individualized suspicion in every warrantless situation. New categories should be acknowledged only upon
establishing a very substantial distinction between the safeguards available and the oppressive or arbitrary nature of the
search or seizure.
Applying this analysis to the instant case results in greater
protection of individual rights than was afforded by the Court's
analysis. The reasonableness of authorizing the seizure without a
warrant has been established by statute and accepted by the
Court.121Thus, law enforcement interests have been recognized
and accommodated in the proper context. The next question is
whether or not the procedural safeguards are adequate. The seizures in the instant case were not oppressive, since they did not
involve an arrest or search of the person, or a search or seizure of
his possessions.122They merely constituted a brief detention for
questioning. Controls on arbitrariness, however, differ between
the two checkpoints. Since all cars are stopped at the Sarita
checkpoint, the arbitrariness of selective referral is not present.
That seizure is therefore reasonable without further safeguards.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
121. The Court decisions beginning with Almeida-Sanchez have never questioned the
statutory authorization to search or seize without a warrant.
122. It could be argued that the officer's view into the car was a search. But this is
not sufficiently intrusive to be oppressive. Such a search occurs wherever a law enforcement officer is authorized to be, thus discretion is controlled by checkpoint location. The
holding in Brignoni-Ponce precludes this type of search for officers on roving patrol absent
the justification of founded suspicion.
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The potential for abuse of discretion in the referral system at San
Clemente, however, violates freedom from arbitrary intrusions.
Such discretionary selection would be constitutionally sound only
when more adequate safeguards, such as reasonable sukicion,
are provided.
Requiring reasonable suspicion would in all likelihood render
This is a serious conthe San Clemente checkpoint in0perab1e.l~~
sequence in view of the legitimate law enforcement interest in
controlling illegal aliens. On the other hand, the precedent of
permitting law enforcement interests to result in the abrogation
of constitutional rights could have far reaching repercussions.
The Court should not reach to such lengths to protect law enforcement interests.124
123. In fact the San Clemente checkpoint ceased operation when the Ninth Circuit
imposed the founded suspicion requirement. See note 96 supra. Even under a founded
suspicion requirement, however, the checkpoint may still be able to function by allowing
founded suspicion to develop as cars roll-through or make a fleeting stop. See note 94 and
accompanying text supra.
124. These law enforcement interests are more appropriately protected by legislation
that provides alternative law enforcement measures. The fourth amendment creates difficulties with current enforcement measures only when they are performed away from the
border or its functional equivalents, because those crossing the border have different rights
as compared to those within the country. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925),
the Court said cars could be arbitrarily stopped "in crossing an international boundary
because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully
brought in." Id. at 154 (emphasis added). This power a t the border was reaffirmed in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883-84 (1975), and Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). Thus Congress could deal with the illegal alien
problem by eliminating or reducing the need for checkpoints away from the border.
There are two reasons for checkpoints away from the borders: First, many aliens enter
a t unpatrolled locations, and second, the border pass system is abused. If these reasons
for removed checkpoints were obviated, then law enforcement interests would not suffer
unduly by eliminating permanent checkpoints.
Two possible alternatives exist that might remove that rationale for permanent,
removed checkpoints. First, increased patrolling might be a solution to the illegal alien
problem. Effective patrolling of the 2000 mile border is, however, a physical impossibility.
Increased patrols have not proven productive in the past. See United States v. Baca, 368
F. Supp. 398, 405 (S.D.Cal. 1973). Moreover, such patrolling may be prohibitively expensive (the Ninth Circuit took judicial notice of this fact in the instant case, 514 F.2d a t
318). Second, concerted efforts could be made to reduce the abuses of the border pass
system. While border passes, authorized by INS regulations, 8 C.F.R. 4 212.6 (1977), could
be granted in fewer cases or discontinued altogether, there are serious diplomatic and
economic drawbacks to such a proposal.
Since better employment is a primary reason for illegal alien entry, an alternative law
enforcement technique could focus on reducing that incentive. One method would be to
impose criminal penalties on employers of illegal aliens. See CAL.LABORCODE$ 2805(a)
(West Supp. 1976) (this statute was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), rev'g 40 Cal. App. 3d 976,115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974)).
Current federal law specifically excludes employment from the punishable offenses consti-
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The Court made significant strides in fourth amendment jurisprudence by its break with the tradition that reasonableness in
a warrantless situation requires elements of probable cause. This
advancement, however, is not without its perils, the most significant of which is the balancing of public interests against individual interests to determine which searches and seizures are reasonable. The proposed alternative analytical framework, with its
emphasis on the individual's fourth amendment right to be free
from arbitrary and oppressive intrusions, suggests a method of
averting misuse of the precedent.
tuting harboring illegal aliens. 8 U.S.C. 4 1324(a) (1970). To date, efforts to amend this
provision to include employment have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., H.R. 982, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., Hearings on H.R. 982 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1975) (an earlier bill, H.R.982, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., passed the House, 119
CONG.REc. 14,208-09 (1973), but died in the Senate). Former INS Commissioner Chapman has suggested that monetary penalties for employment might decrease the problem.
Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United States, 13
SANDIEGOL. REV. 34, 40 (1975). Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, has expressed
uncertainty as to the efficacy of this remedy. United States v. Ortiz, 422 US. at 900
(concurring opinion).
In any event, legislative action is the appropriate channel for vindication of law
enforcement interests in the present context.

